alphafold-database

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In SKILL.md, the download_proteome function uses subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, check=True) where the command string is constructed using f-strings from variables taxonomy_id and output_dir. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if an agent populates these parameters with unsanitized input from a user prompt.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches configuration and data from alphafold.ebi.ac.uk and uniprot.org, and accesses public datasets on Google Cloud Storage (gs://public-datasets-deepmind-alphafold-v4). These are well-known scientific and cloud services, and the references are consistent with the skill's purpose.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes external data from scientific APIs without explicit boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from REST API responses (AlphaFold/UniProt) and BigQuery metadata in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are used in the provided Python examples.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (subprocess.run), perform network requests (requests, urllib), and write to the file system.
  • Sanitization: The provided Python examples do not demonstrate validation or sanitization of external data before it is used in command execution or further processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 4, 2026, 05:38 AM