skills/aiskillstore/marketplace/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Vulnerability to Path Traversal (Zip Slip). The file ooxml/scripts/unpack.py uses zipfile.ZipFile(input_file).extractall(output_path) on user-provided Office documents. A malicious archive containing filenames with ../ sequences can overwrite arbitrary files on the local filesystem outside the intended directory.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): Potential XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability. In ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py, lxml.etree.parse is used to process XML content from the document without explicitly disabling entity resolution or DTD loading. This could allow an attacker to read local files or perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Subprocess execution of soffice. The script ooxml/scripts/pack.py executes the soffice (LibreOffice) binary to validate documents. Processing complex, attacker-controlled file formats through a large office suite increases the risk of exploiting vulnerabilities in the conversion engine.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): High-risk ingestion surface with significant capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: ooxml/scripts/unpack.py (Office file extraction).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not delimit or warn the agent about untrusted content within the XML files.
  • Capability inventory: subprocess.run(['soffice', ...]) in ooxml/scripts/pack.py, arbitrary file writes in ooxml/scripts/unpack.py, and file reading in ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation of zip entry paths or XML structure for malicious entities.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 09:44 PM