chrome-extension-architect

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses piped remote script execution for installation and updates.
  • Evidence found in README.md, commands/opencode/chrome-extension-architect.md, and commands/droid/chrome-extension-architect.md using the pattern bash <(curl ...) or curl | bash.
  • These scripts are fetched from the vendor's official GitHub organization (Alcyone-Labs) and represent normal deployment functionality.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads shell scripts from external repositories to facilitate setup and maintenance.
  • Targeted URLs include raw.githubusercontent.com/Alcyone-Labs/chrome-extension-agent-skill and raw.githubusercontent.com/Alcyone-Labs/agent-skills.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes local shell commands to manage the skill lifecycle.
  • Uses bash process substitution and piped input to run scripts.
  • Logic in command files triggers these actions based on specific flags in the user's request.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill command definitions create an attack surface where untrusted user data can trigger privileged execution.
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes $ARGUMENTS in the command files for Droid and OpenCode.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters separating user input from the update logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute remote scripts via curl and bash.
  • Sanitization: No input sanitization is performed on the arguments before checking for the --update-skill flag.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 10:03 AM