semgrep-rule-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its high-privilege capabilities combined with the ingestion of untrusted data. Malicious code snippets or compromised documentation could trick the agent into generating harmful rules or executing unintended commands.\n
- Ingestion points: Documentation is fetched via
WebFetchfrom multiple external URLs. Local code for analysis is ingested viaRead,Grep, andGlob.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or specific prompt engineering techniques to isolate untrusted input from instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
WriteandEditto create files, andBashto execute thesemgrepbinary.\n - Sanitization: Absent. The workflow does not specify any sanitization or validation of the code snippets before they are used to generate rules.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill mandates fetching documentation from several external domains (
semgrep.dev,appsec.guide,github.com/semgrep). While these are legitimate sources for rule-writing guidance, they are not within the predefinedTRUST-SCOPE-RULElist of trusted organizations.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill core functionality involves using theBashtool to executesemgrepcommands (--test,--dump-ast,-f) on dynamically generated content. This execution path is a risk if the generated rule content is influenced by adversarial data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata