git-worktree-feature-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
worktree-start.shandworktree-finish.shexecute variousgitcommands (e.g.,merge,branch -d,worktree add) using user-provided arguments for branch names and paths. While variables are quoted to prevent shell word-splitting, the scripts lack the--separator in several Git calls. This makes them susceptible to argument injection if a user provides a branch name starting with a hyphen (e.g.,-Dor--help). Additionally, the--pathargument inworktree-start.shallows for directory creation and repository initialization at arbitrary system locations where the user has permissions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user data (branch names, paths) to perform significant repository and file system operations.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied branch names, base references, and file paths provided via the agent's prompts.
- Boundary markers: The agent guidelines recommend confirming the user's intent before making changes, but no technical boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used when interpolating these values into script arguments.
- Capability inventory: The scripts perform directory creation (
mkdir -p), repository merging (git merge), branch deletion (git branch -d), and directory removal (git worktree remove). - Sanitization: The
branch_slugfunction provides some sanitization for directory names, but the raw branch name is used directly in Git commands without sufficient validation or escaping for Git-specific control characters.
Audit Metadata