sre-engineer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python templates that use the
subprocess.runmodule to execute system-level and infrastructure management commands. Evidence includes calls tokubectlfor pod management,systemctlfor service restarts, andiptablesortcfor network manipulation in the self-healing and chaos engineering scripts. These are high-privilege operations, though the scripts follow the best practice of passing arguments as lists to mitigate shell injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its architectural reliance on external data. The agent monitors output from tools like
curlandkubectl get pods, and reads system metrics. There are no boundary markers or sanitization logic to prevent instructions embedded in logs or metric labels from influencing the agent's logic. This is particularly relevant given the powerful administrative capabilities provided to the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Misleading metadata is present in the
SKILL.mdfile, which listsJeffallanas the author via a GitHub URL, while the verified author context provided isalexander-danilenko. This discrepancy can lead to a misjudgment of the skill's origin and trust profile.
Audit Metadata