audio-transcriber
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/transcribe.pyto execute external AI command-line interfaces such as the Claude CLI and GitHub Copilot CLI. It also executes shell commands to check for the presence of tools likeffmpegand to manage Python package installations viapip. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation script
scripts/install-requirements.shdownloads AI models (approximately 74MB to 1.5GB) from official repositories for Faster-Whisper and OpenAI Whisper. These are well-known technology providers and do not pose a direct security threat, but users should be aware of the network activity during setup. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Untrusted audio content is transcribed into text in
scripts/transcribe.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses simple triple-dash delimiters (
---) to separate the transcription from instructions, which may not be sufficient to prevent a sophisticated injection from overriding the agent's summary instructions. - Capability inventory: The system can execute external CLI tools and write to the local file system based on processed output.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the transcribed text before it is interpolated into prompts for the AI LLMs.
Audit Metadata