evolving-config
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data from external sources (Perplexity queries) to generate configuration recommendations.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the context via
mcp__perplexity-ask__perplexity_askin Phase 3 of the SKILL.md file. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the external tool output as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive project access, including
Read,Write, andEditpermissions for configuration files, as well asTaskCreateandTaskUpdatefor workflow management. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the external content before it is processed for gap analysis.
- Mitigation: The risk is mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop step using
AskUserQuestionbefore changes are applied, and a provided--dry-runargument that suppresses file modifications. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the latest Claude Code features and changes from the official Anthropics GitHub repository's changelog.
Audit Metadata