documenting-code
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Reads project source code and existing documentation files (
*.md,doc.go) identified viafindandgit diffcommands. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define clear delimiters or instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the files being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Tasktool to spawn a sub-agent capable of writing files (updating documentation) and executing shell commands (git,find). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic to filter or escape potential instructions found in the analyzed documentation or code comments.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill explicitly instructs the sub-agent to execute shell commands (
git diff --name-only HEAD~5andfind . -name '*.md' -o -name 'doc.go'). While these are common development tasks, they provide a footprint for an attacker to escalate privileges if the sub-agent's prompt is compromised via injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The skill interpolates user-provided input (
{user's choice from Step 1}) directly into the prompt for thedocs-keepersub-agent. Although theAskUserQuestiontool provides specific options, the lack of explicit sanitization before interpolation into a high-capability sub-agent prompt is a security risk.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata