curator-repo-learn
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform repository cloning and execute local management scripts such as.claude/scripts/curator-learn.sh,curator-ingest.sh, andbackfill-domains.sh. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from arbitrary GitHub repositories using
git clonefor the purpose of analysis and knowledge extraction. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted code from external repositories to generate rules that update the agent's procedural memory in
.claude/rules/learned/. - Ingestion points: Source code, configuration, and documentation files within external repositories cloned to the
.claude/corpus/learning/directory. - Boundary markers: The prompt provided to the analysis subagent (
ralph-researcher) lacks clear delimiters or explicit instructions to disregard embedded commands or adversarial instructions within the source material. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(command execution),Write(modifying local rules and manifests), andTask(spawning autonomous subagents). - Sanitization: While the skill includes a URL validation step, there is no evidence of sanitizing or filtering the content of the repository files before they are analyzed to create new behavioral rules.
Audit Metadata