self-improvement

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection feedback loop by design, which can be exploited to modify agent behavior through untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to capture content from tool outputs via the CLAUDE_TOOL_OUTPUT environment variable and user chat corrections into markdown files in the .learnings/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: The captured data is appended to log files without boundary markers or instructions to disregard embedded commands, making it susceptible to injection.
  • Capability inventory: The skill encourages the agent to promote logged content to high-priority instruction files such as CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, and SOUL.md. It also provides a script (extract-skill.sh) to generate new executable skills.
  • Sanitization: There is no automated or instructed sanitization process to filter or validate external content before it is integrated into the agent's long-term memory or instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local shell scripts (scripts/activator.sh, scripts/error-detector.sh) configured as hooks that run automatically during the agent's session (e.g., on prompt submission or tool output). It also provides scripts/extract-skill.sh which performs file and directory operations based on user-provided skill names.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation suggests installation from external sources, including a GitHub repository and the ClawdHub package registry.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 20, 2026, 08:04 AM