context-snapshot

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill captures untrusted conversation data and prepares it as a set of instructions for future agents, creating a persistent injection chain.
  • Ingestion points: Processes the entire active conversation to map goals, decisions, and constraints (SKILL.md, Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: None. While it uses a structured Markdown template, it does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the captured sections.
  • Capability inventory: Possesses file-writing capabilities to any user-specified path (SKILL.md, Step 5).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill is explicitly told to 'Capture exact wording' and 'Preserve exact phrasing' (SKILL.md, Step 2 & Critical Rules), ensuring malicious payloads remain intact.
  • Downstream impact: The 'Handoff Prompt for Next Agent' in context-template.md creates a high-trust context by instructing the next agent to 'Treat "Fact" as authoritative,' potentially bypassing the next agent's safety filters if the 'Fact' contains an injection.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill allows for unvalidated file system writes via user-provided paths.
  • Evidence: 'If the user provides a path, use it... Create the parent directory if it does not exist' (SKILL.md, Step 1).
  • Risk: An attacker could provide a path to a sensitive configuration file (e.g., ~/.bashrc or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys). If the agent environment lacks path sandboxing, the handoff content (which includes user-influenced 'Facts') could be written to these files to achieve persistence or execution.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 08:10 AM