agy-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/relay.mjsscript executes theagyCLI andgitcommands as its primary function. It uses Node.jsspawnandexecFileSyncto interact with these tools using absolute paths and properly constructed argument arrays. This implementation follows security best practices for sub-process management and is consistent with the skill's stated purpose. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task instructions (briefs) and codebase content which are passed to the
agyCLI for implementation. This pattern inherently possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. The skill extensively mitigates this risk through its design and documentation, requiring a human or orchestrating agent to perform a detailed diff review, re-run project gates (tests, linters), and verify all changes before committing them to the repository. - Ingestion points: Instructions are read from files or stdin in
scripts/relay.mjsand passed to theagytool. - Boundary markers: Documentation in
references/writing-the-brief.mdrecommends using XML-like structure (e.g.,<task>,<verification_loop>) to provide clear boundaries for the implementer. - Capability inventory: The relay script can execute the
agyCLI andgit. Theagytool itself has the capability to modify the local filesystem and execute arbitrary project commands (such as test runners). - Sanitization: The skill relies on post-execution verification steps, as detailed in
references/review-and-land.md, where the orchestrator must confirm that the diff matches the brief and that all security/linting gates pass.
Audit Metadata