cline-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's relay script (
scripts/relay.mjs) executes external CLI tools includingclineandgitto perform coding tasks. It implements safety measures by validating shell-sensitive arguments (--model,--provider) against a restricted character set and passing the task brief via stdin rather than command-line arguments to prevent shell injection on Windows systems where the shell shim is used. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge for an external coding agent, ingesting untrusted task instructions (the "brief") and passing them to an agent with system-level shell and file access. This ingestion point at
brief.txtor stdin creates a surface for indirect injection. To mitigate this risk, the skill includes a static boundary prompt ("Follow the task instructions provided on stdin.") and extensive documentation on "Review and Land" procedures, mandating that the orchestrator verify all code changes manually and re-run project gates rather than trusting the agent's self-reported success. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The relay script dynamically locates and executes a sibling script (
../../delegate-setup/scripts/lane.mjs) usingnodewhen the--laneconfiguration option is active. This execution uses a path relative to the skill's installation directory to resolve configuration dials and represents a local functional dependency within the skill suite.
Audit Metadata