cursor-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/relay.mjsexecutes thecursor-agentandgitbinaries to perform its tasks. It implements several security best practices to mitigate risk: - Argument Validation: Critical arguments such as model names and session IDs are validated against strict alphanumeric regex patterns (
SAFE_MODEL,SAFE_SESSION) to prevent shell injection. - Secure Argument Handling: The script uses platform-specific quoting on Windows to safely handle paths with spaces or special characters when launching the
.cmdshim. - Standard Input for Payloads: Task instructions (the 'brief') are passed via
stdinrather than command-line arguments, which prevents them from appearing in process lists and avoids OS-level argument size limits. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a delegation tool, the skill relays natural language instructions to a sub-agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. This risk is addressed through the following architecture:
- Ingestion points: User tasks and repository context are formatted into a brief (documented in
references/writing-the-brief.md) and processed byscripts/relay.mjs. - Boundary markers: The documentation explicitly guides the orchestrator to use XML-like tags (e.g.,
<task>,<action_safety>) to separate instructions from data. - Capability inventory: The sub-agent (
cursor-agent) has the capability to write files and execute commands within the specified working directory. - Sanitization & Human-in-the-Loop: The skill enforces a 'Review and Land' boundary where the orchestrator is instructed to verify all code changes and re-run local tests before committing any work, ensuring that no malicious code generated by an injected sub-prompt is accepted automatically.
Audit Metadata