kimi-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
relay.mjsscript invokes thekimiandgitbinaries through thenode:child_processmodule to perform the core task delegation and state tracking. It also executes a Node.js script from a sibling directory (../../delegate-setup/scripts/lane.mjs) when resolving configuration lanes usingprocess.execPath. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The task brief is passed as a command-line argument to the
kimiprocess using the--promptflag. This makes the brief's content visible to other users on the same host via process monitoring tools likeps. The skill's documentation explicitly notes this risk and advises against including secrets directly in the brief text. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as an instruction relay for a secondary AI implementer (
kimi) which operates in an autonomous "auto permission" mode. Malicious instructions provided in the task brief could lead to unintended filesystem modifications or execution of project commands. - Ingestion points: User-provided task descriptions are read from files or stdin by the
relay.mjsscript and passed to the implementer CLI. - Boundary markers: The documentation recommends using structural XML tags (e.g.,
<task>,<action_safety>,<verification_loop>) within the brief to separate instructions from data and constraints. - Capability inventory: The implementer (
kimi) can modify files in the repository and execute project-specific commands (such as tests, lints, or build scripts). - Sanitization: The relay script does not perform sanitization of the brief content; it relies on the orchestrator agent to manually review filesystem diffs and verify project gates before committing the implementation work.
Audit Metadata