qoder-delegate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The relay.mjs script manages the execution of qodercli to perform tasks, git status to verify changes, and taskkill (on Windows) to manage process termination. All commands are executed with shell: false using Node's spawn and spawnSync APIs, which prevents command injection by avoiding shell parsing of arguments.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes output from an external implementation agent (qodercli), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the implementer were to produce malicious instructions. This is addressed by mandatory evidence in the skill instructions:
  • Ingestion points: scripts/relay.mjs reads qodercli stdout/stderr; the orchestrator reads result.json and touchedFiles.
  • Boundary markers: SKILL.md and references/review-and-land.md contain explicit warnings: "Review
  • do not trust the self-report" and "Treat Qoder's final message and gate outcomes as claims."
  • Capability inventory: Limited to spawning qodercli, git, and taskkill via a wrapper script.
  • Sanitization: The orchestrator is strictly instructed to independently verify the full diff and manually rerun project gates (tests, linting) before committing work.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The relay.mjs script dynamically locates and executes a configuration resolver from a sibling skill (delegate-setup) using a relative path. This dependency is checked for existence before execution and is invoked via the Node.js executable.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides links to the official Qoder documentation (qoder.com) for manual installation of the required CLI tool. The skill does not perform automated or hidden downloads.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 04:59 PM