groove-admin-help
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Potential for indirect prompt injection via the configuration file. The skill instructions require the agent to read
.groove/index.mdand interpolate its values into the output. If an attacker can modify this file, they could inject instructions that the agent might follow due to its high capability level. - Ingestion points:
.groove/index.md(read by the agent to populate the help output). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the configuration values as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill requests broad permissions via
allowed-tools, includingBashaccess forgit,gh(GitHub CLI), andnpx(executing Node packages), along with file systemWriteandEditcapabilities. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform any validation or escaping of the data read from the configuration file before displaying it.
Audit Metadata