agent-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill relies on the agent-browser CLI. The provided metadata references (https://github.com/AnsarUllahAnasZ360/cc-guide and https://agent-browser.dev) are not associated with any Trusted Organizations. Use of tools from unverified sources increases the risk of supply chain attacks.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The agent-browser eval command allows the agent to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context. While a standard feature for automation, it presents a risk if the agent is manipulated into executing code that targets the user's active sessions or local environment.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The documentation explicitly demonstrates retrieving sensitive data via agent-browser eval "localStorage.getItem('token')". This pattern encourages the extraction of session credentials, which could be easily exfiltrated if combined with network tools.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection from malicious web content.
  • Ingestion points: agent-browser open, agent-browser snapshot, and agent-browser get text allow untrusted data from external websites into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters to help the agent distinguish between its own instructions and the content retrieved from the web.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses Bash tool access, browser eval capabilities, and network routing control (agent-browser network route).
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform any validation or filtering on the data scraped from web pages before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:17 PM