comments
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Data Ingestion Surface: The skill reads state and configuration data from
comment-tracker.yamlandCLAUDE.md. This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the data within these files originates from untrusted sources, such as a third-party regulatory feed. - Ingestion points: Data is loaded from
~/.claude/plugins/config/claude-for-legal/regulatory-legal/comment-tracker.yamlandCLAUDE.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or "ignore" instructions when processing the content of these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to update the local tracker file and initiate Slack notifications.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation steps are defined for the data ingested from these files before it is used to influence the agent's logic.
- Local File Modification: The skill performs write operations to
~/.claude/plugins/config/claude-for-legal/regulatory-legal/comment-tracker.yamlto log decisions. While this is an intended feature for tracking purposes, it involves the modification of local configuration files. - External Notification Integration: The skill includes logic to send Slack DMs via a Slack MCP. This functionality depends on external tool availability and the configuration of the
owner_slackvariable, representing a functional integration with an external communication platform.
Audit Metadata