prospect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill processes untrusted user input from the
$ARGUMENTSvariable in Step 1 to extract search filters. This presents a potential surface where malicious instructions embedded in the user's description could attempt to influence the agent's behavior or tool parameters. - Ingestion points: The natural language ICP description is ingested via
$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing the input.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to search for organizations, perform bulk enrichment of people and companies (including PII), and create contacts in a CRM via the
apollo_contacts_createtool. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the extracted search filters is defined before they are passed to the MCP tools.
- Sensitive Data Handling (PII): The skill is designed to retrieve and display personal information, including emails and phone numbers, through the
apollo_people_bulk_matchtool. While this aligns with the skill's intended prospecting purpose, it involves the handling and presentation of sensitive contact data.
Audit Metadata