cmux-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands via the
cmuxtool to launch secondary AI agents with configurations that disable security guardrails. - Evidence: In
SKILL.md(Step 4) andreferences/agent-profiles.md, the instructions specify usingclaude --dangerously-skip-permissionsandcodex --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxas the default "Auto-Approve" mode. - Risk: These flags are designed to bypass human-in-the-loop safety checks and sandbox protections, allowing delegated tasks to perform system operations without user confirmation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it acts as a bridge, passing user-controlled text directly to an autonomous child agent.
- Ingestion points: User-provided task instructions extracted in
SKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: Absent. The
{task_prompt}is interpolated directly into the command stream inSKILL.md(Step 6) without delimiters or instructions for the child agent to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to create terminal workspaces, execute arbitrary commands via
cmux send, and read full screen output, while targeting agents running with elevated autonomous permissions. - Sanitization: None. The skill does not validate, escape, or sanitize the user's task prompt before it is transmitted to the secondary agent.
Audit Metadata