skill-audit

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is explicitly designed to analyze untrusted external code and instructions from third-party repositories and local directories. This represents a maximum attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: Uses WebFetch for GitHub URLs and Read/Glob for local file systems as specified in the README.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation claims to treat content as untrusted, but without the actual skill definition, the effectiveness of delimiting markers cannot be verified.
  • Capability inventory: Accesses system files via Read, Grep, and Glob; performs network requests via WebFetch.
  • Sanitization: Claims to redact secrets and use isolated execution, but the fundamental risk of an agent processing adversarial instructions remains.
  • External Downloads (LOW): The skill downloads remote content from GitHub (api.github.com and raw.githubusercontent.com). While these are common sources, they are used here to pull potentially malicious skill code into the local environment for analysis.
  • Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill requires access to sensitive local paths such as .claude/skills/ and .claude/commands/ to perform its audit functions. While necessary for its stated purpose, this provides a pathway for reading local configuration and skill data.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 04:55 AM