wiki-digest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-generated markdown files and raw notes from the vault to generate digests. These external data sources are untrusted and could contain malicious instructions designed to hijack the agent's reasoning or output during the synthesis process.
- Ingestion points: Markdown files (
.md) throughout the$OBSIDIAN_VAULT_PATHand files within the_raw/directory. - Boundary markers: The skill does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to isolate ingested content from the agent's control flow.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write new markdown files to the vault, modify existing files (like
index.mdandlog.md), and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested content before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
qmdutility to update search indices and generate embeddings after writing to the vault. While these commands are local, they represent a capability that could be targeted if the agent is compromised via prompt injection. - Evidence: Execution of
${QMD_CLI:-qmd} update,${QMD_CLI:-qmd} embed, and${QMD_CLI:-qmd} lscommands defined in the QMD Refresh section.
Audit Metadata