notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
nlmCLI tool for all operations, which involves running subprocesses to interact with the NotebookLM service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from multiple external sources. Ingestion points: External content is retrieved via
nlm source add(supporting URLs, local PDF/files, YouTube transcripts, and Google Drive documents) and through thenlm research importcommand. Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use delimiters or specialized instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the retrieved source material. Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to query these sources via AI (nlm query), generate shareable content (podcasts, videos, reports), and modify notebook permissions (nlm share public). Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, sanitization, or filtering of the content retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the AI. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The authentication mechanism involves extracting session cookies from the user's web browser. The
nlm logincommand accesses sensitive browser data to maintain the session, which represents a high-sensitivity credential handling pattern. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
notebooklm-mcp-clipackage (v0.3.3) from an external repository to function.
Audit Metadata