yandex-metrika
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell scripts that process user-supplied arguments. A path traversal vulnerability exists in the
cache_dir_for_counterfunction withinscripts/common.sh. The--counterargument is used to build file system paths without sanitization (e.g.,_cdc_dir="$CACHE_DIR/counter_$1"), which can be exploited to create directories and write files (CSV reports) to arbitrary locations on the file system relative to the skill's root directory or via absolute paths. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires a
YANDEX_METRIKA_TOKENto be stored in aconfig/.envfile. Documentation guides users on how to obtain this OAuth token from Yandex. Handling long-lived sensitive tokens in plain-text configuration files is a standard but high-risk practice that requires careful environment management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes automated network requests to official Yandex API endpoints (
api-metrika.yandex.net,oauth.yandex.ru) usingcurl. These downloads are necessary for fetching analytics data and managing session authentication but involve the transmission of sensitive OAuth headers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from an external API (Yandex Metrika) and presents it to the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: API responses processed in
counters.sh,goals.sh, and other reporting scripts. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are used to separate API data from instructions. Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities and network access. Sanitization: Minimal sanitization is performed on data retrieved from the API before it is displayed or cached.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata