worktree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
createsubcommand uses the<name>parameter from$ARGUMENTSdirectly in shell commands (e.g.,git worktree add -b worktree-<name> ~/Documents/<repo>-<name> <base-branch>) without sanitization or escaping. This allows for potential command injection if shell metacharacters (e.g.,; rm -rf /) are included in the name argument. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub PRs to automate worktree cleanup, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Evidence Chain: 1. Ingestion points: External data fetched via
gh pr listinSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to isolate external content. 3. Capability inventory: Shell execution viaBashtool for Git and file operations inSKILL.md. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the logic directly processes the raw output from the GitHub CLI tool.
Audit Metadata