proposal-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified in the proposal assembly logic.\n
- Ingestion points: External RFP data enters the context via the
matchBlocksToRfpandassembleProposalfunctions, specifically usingrfp.titleandrfp.descriptionfields.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill uses standard string replacement (e.g.,
{{PROJECT_TITLE}}) to build the final document without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Read,Grep, andGlobtools for filesystem access and Convex mutations for database persistence.\n - Sanitization: Absent. Untrusted external content from the RFP object is interpolated directly into the proposal content without validation or escaping.
Audit Metadata