vhs-recording
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
vhscommand-line tool, which interprets and runs terminal commands defined within.tapefiles. This tool simulates terminal input, allowing for the execution of any shell command. Evidence:SKILL.mdPhase 3 andmodules/execution.mdboth define the execution ofvhs <tape-file.tape>. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions to download and install several dependencies from GitHub and other package managers. Evidence:
SKILL.mdandmodules/execution.mdrecommendgo install github.com/charmbracelet/vhs@latestandgo install github.com/aspect-build/aspect-cli/pkg/ttyd@latest. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it executes commands from input files that may come from untrusted sources. . Ingestion points: Tape files are read and executed as part of the primary workflow (SKILL.md, Phase 1 and 3). . Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or provide warnings to the agent about ignoring instructions embedded in the data. . Capability inventory: The skill can execute any command available in the terminal environment through the simulated input feature of VHS. . Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or validation of the commands within the tape file is performed beyond syntax checking.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes an optional feature to publish recordings to an external public service, which could lead to accidental data exposure if secrets are captured in the recording. Evidence:
modules/execution.mddocuments the--publishflag, which uploads recordings tovhs.charm.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Setup instructions include commands requiring elevated privileges for environment configuration. Evidence:
modules/execution.mdmentionssudo apt install fonts-jetbrains-monofor font configuration in WSL2.
Audit Metadata