discord-voice
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically resolves and imports the OpenClaw extension API from the filesystem at runtime in
src/core-bridge.ts. While it includes integrity checks such as verifying the package name inpackage.json, the use of dynamic imports on computed paths is a significant execution capability.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted audio data from Discord voice channels, transcribes it into text, and interpolates it into the agent's system prompt. - Ingestion points: User audio transcribed in
index.tsvia various STT providers. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction in
index.tsuses instructional text but lacks structural delimiters (like XML tags) to isolate untrusted transcriptions. - Capability inventory: The integrated agent has full access to tools, which may include subprocess execution and network operations.
- Sanitization: Transcribed text is used as-is without filtering for injection patterns or adversarial instructions.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to several well-known third-party services for core functionality, including OpenAI, ElevenLabs, Deepgram, and Amazon Polly. It also downloads model weights from HuggingFace via the Xenova/Transformers library. These interactions are documented and target established service providers.
Audit Metadata