intlayer-content
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents and enables access to the local filesystem through the
file()function, which explicitly supports absolute paths (e.g.,/users/username/path/to/file.txt). This allows reading sensitive system or user files. When combined with thefetch()function, this capability could be used to exfiltrate file contents to remote servers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The "Function Fetching" feature allows for the execution of arbitrary synchronous or asynchronous JavaScript/TypeScript logic at build or runtime. This enables unverified code execution within the environment where the content is processed.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the
fetch()function to retrieve data from external URLs, which allows for the dynamic inclusion of remote content. This can be exploited to download malicious payloads or interact with untrusted services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its content processing nodes. 1. Ingestion points: External data via
fetch(), local file content viafile(), and variables interpolated intoinsert()templates. 2. Boundary markers: Documentation lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions within dynamic content. 3. Capability inventory: Network access (fetch), file access (file), and logic execution (Function Fetching). 4. Sanitization: Whiletagfilteris mentioned for Markdown, no sanitization is defined for other insertion points.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata