vault-capture
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
defuddlepackage globally (npm install -g defuddle) if it is not present. This involves downloading and installing third-party code from the npm registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs multiple shell operations using CLI tools like
defuddleto parse web content andobsidianto search, create, and append data within the user's local vault. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it fetches untrusted content from external URLs and processes it without sanitization or boundary markers. This could allow an attacker-controlled website to inject instructions that influence the agent's note-taking or summarization behavior.
- Ingestion points: Content extracted from external URLs via
defuddle parse <url>inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; the extracted content is directly interpolated into the note structure.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
defuddle,obsidian), file system writes viaobsidian createand theWritetool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the extracted markdown content is performed before processing.
Audit Metadata