slack
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill includes examples and flows that embed session tokens and user passwords directly into commands (e.g., curl with "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_XOXC}", sourcing tokens.env, and an automated login example "login user@example.com mypassword"), which would require the agent to handle or output secret values verbatim.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). High risk: the skill intentionally extracts Slack credentials (Chrome cookie decryption and AppleScript/localStorage token scraping), persists tokens, and exposes arbitrary JavaScript execution in the user's authenticated browser context and UI-automation APIs — all of which can be used to steal credentials, exfiltrate data, or act as a remote backdoor if misused or invoked without explicit, informed user consent.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill explicitly fetches and interprets user-generated Slack content via the Slack Web API and browser mode (see SKILL.md "Read Operations" — conversations.history, conversations.replies, search.messages — and browser-mode references/Playwright bridge that navigate to app.slack.com and snapshot/interact), so untrusted third‑party messages/files can be read and materially influence the agent's decisions and subsequent actions.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
Audit Metadata