openclaw-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to download and execute shell scripts from an untrusted source (https://openclaw.ai/install.sh) by piping them directly to bash. This pattern bypasses security validation of the remote content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation workflow involves executing multiple system-level commands, including global npm package installations, service management via launchctl, and modifying firewall configurations (ufw).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill configures the agent to ingest data from messaging channels like Telegram and iMessage, introducing a risk of indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External messages received through Telegram and the macOS Messages database (references/telegram-channel.md, references/imessage-channel.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill suggests using dmPolicy: "pairing" and requireMention: true to restrict access, though these do not fully sanitize incoming data.
  • Capability inventory: The setup environment grants access to shell execution (/bash), file system writes, and network operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of external input before it is processed by the agent's logic.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches installation scripts and software from well-known services including Docker (get.docker.com), Tailscale (tailscale.com), Homebrew, and nvm.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://openclaw.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 05:20 AM