browser-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to process and act upon untrusted web content, creating a significant Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8). \n
  • Ingestion points: Web content is ingested via agent-browser and browser-use (e.g., in SKILL.md and references/agent-browser-reference.md). \n
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the web data described in the documentation. \n
  • Capability inventory: The agent can navigate, click, input text, and take screenshots, allowing for full browser interaction. \n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization of web content is performed before it reaches the AI logic. \n
  • Risk: A malicious site could take control of the browser session to perform actions on other websites where the user might be logged in. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the user to install third-party packages from NPM and PyPI that are not in the trusted source list. \n
  • Evidence: npm install -g actionbook, npm install -g agent-browser, and pip install browser-use are required for functionality. \n
  • Binaries: Requires playwright install, which downloads large browser binaries from remote servers. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Uses CLI tools to perform browser operations, which involves executing system commands with potentially untrusted URL arguments provided at runtime.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 10:15 PM