pm-refine

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like git status and git branch -a to validate the state of the repository and ensure no conflicts exist before creating new branch suggestions or specification files.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from user inputs, Figma designs, and Jira tickets which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External data is ingested from user requests in SKILL.md, Figma designs via the Figma MCP in Step 4, and existing Jira ticket descriptions in Refine Mode.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions for sub-agents in agents/qa-planner-agent.md and agents/refinement-agent.md use placeholders such as {ACCEPTANCE_CRITERIA} and {FEATURE_DESCRIPTION} without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local repository (enggenie/spec_[slug].md) and create or update Jira tickets using the Jira MCP.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering logic is defined for the content before it is interpolated into the prompts.
  • [SAFE]: The skill includes strong human-in-the-loop controls, requiring explicit user confirmation before creating Jira tickets (Step 6) and before saving the finalized specification to the filesystem (Exit Action).- [SAFE]: No obfuscation, hardcoded credentials, or unauthorized network communication were found. All external integrations (Jira, Figma) are handled through standard model context protocol (MCP) interfaces.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 9, 2026, 11:31 AM