pm-refine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like
git statusandgit branch -ato validate the state of the repository and ensure no conflicts exist before creating new branch suggestions or specification files.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from user inputs, Figma designs, and Jira tickets which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: External data is ingested from user requests in
SKILL.md, Figma designs via the Figma MCP in Step 4, and existing Jira ticket descriptions in Refine Mode. - Boundary markers: The instructions for sub-agents in
agents/qa-planner-agent.mdandagents/refinement-agent.mduse placeholders such as{ACCEPTANCE_CRITERIA}and{FEATURE_DESCRIPTION}without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the data. - Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local repository (
enggenie/spec_[slug].md) and create or update Jira tickets using the Jira MCP. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering logic is defined for the content before it is interpolated into the prompts.
- [SAFE]: The skill includes strong human-in-the-loop controls, requiring explicit user confirmation before creating Jira tickets (Step 6) and before saving the finalized specification to the filesystem (Exit Action).- [SAFE]: No obfuscation, hardcoded credentials, or unauthorized network communication were found. All external integrations (Jira, Figma) are handled through standard model context protocol (MCP) interfaces.
Audit Metadata