review-code
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The YAGNI Check section in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to run agrepcommand using a search term derived from external reviewer feedback. If the reviewer provides a malicious string containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Jira tickets and GitHub PR comments, exposing it to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External review comments and Jira ticket metadata (file:
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No structural delimiters are used to separate external content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
git,grep, and theghCLI, providing significant system and network access (file:SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill uses a manual verification checklist but lacks automated sanitization or escaping of untrusted input strings.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill extracts PR URLs from Jira tickets and uses them in
gh apicalls. An attacker could use a malicious PR link to redirect agent actions and potentially exfiltrate code content to a repository they control.
Audit Metadata