qianfanocr-document-intelligence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/pdf_to_images.pydownloads PDF files from user-provided URLs usingurllib.request.urlopen(line 49). \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/pdf_to_images.pyexecutes thepdftoppmsystem utility viasubprocess.run(line 120) to convert PDF pages into images. Arguments are constructed using a sanitization function (sanitize_name) to reduce the risk of path traversal or command injection from URL-derived filenames. \n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it processes untrusted visual data from images and PDFs without explicit security delimiters. \n - Ingestion points:
scripts/pdf_to_images.py(downloads) andscripts/qianfan_ocr_cli.py(image data extraction). \n - Boundary markers: Absent; the prompts provided in the
references/directory do not utilize explicit boundary markers or instructions to disregard embedded commands in document text. \n - Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local filesystem and execute system utilities (
pdftoppm) via subprocess calls. \n - Sanitization: Filename sanitization is performed, but document content is passed to the VLM without filtering. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple runner scripts (e.g.,
scripts/run_document_parsing.py) utilizeimportlib.utilto dynamically load local utility modules from the skill's own directory. Although the paths are restricted to the localscripts/folder, this involves dynamic code loading patterns.
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