skill-lookup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill is designed to fetch and save arbitrary files from an untrusted external MCP server (prompts.chat).
  • Evidence (SKILL.md): The instructions explicitly direct the agent to 'Save each file to the appropriate location', specifically including 'Scripts
  • Helper scripts (Python, shell, etc.)'.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): By automating the process of downloading scripts and configuration files from a non-whitelisted remote source to the local file system (.claude/skills/), the skill creates a direct path for Remote Code Execution.
  • Evidence (SKILL.md): The get_skill tool retrieves 'all file contents', which are then written to the disk. An attacker serving a malicious skill could include scripts that perform unauthorized actions once the agent or user interacts with them.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The skill communicates with a non-whitelisted external domain (prompts.chat) to perform searches and retrievals, which is an unverified network operation.
  • INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The skill lacks sanitization or boundary markers for the data it ingests from the external MCP server.
  • Ingestion points: Data returned by search_skills and get_skill tools.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to save and present data as-is.
  • Capability inventory: File system writing and network access (via MCP tools).
  • Sanitization: Absent; no validation of file names, content, or script safety.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:43 PM