google-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it retrieves untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/gmail.py(reading email content),scripts/google_docs.py(reading document text),scripts/google_sheets.py(reading spreadsheet data), andscripts/google_notebooklm.py(importing content from URLs). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers used to separate untrusted data from the agent's command instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad permissions, including sending emails, deleting files, and managing calendar events.
- Sanitization: Content retrieved from Google APIs is passed to the agent context without sanitization or validation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local system commands are utilized for notifications and system configuration.
- Evidence:
scripts/maintain_token.pyusessubprocess.runto callnotify-sendandosascriptfor status alerts.scripts/install_services.shmanages user-level systemd timers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to transfer data from Google services to the local system.
- Evidence:
scripts/google_drive.pyandscripts/google_photos.pyprovide commands for downloading files and media items.scripts/google_notebooklm.pyallows adding sources via remote URLs.
Audit Metadata