manimate
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by spawning a sub-agent to generate Python code for Manim scenes, which are then immediately executed on the local machine using the
manim rendercommand. This architectural pattern represents a form of dynamic code execution where the source logic is created at runtime based on external input. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 5 and Step 6. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several system commands including
python3,manim, andffmpeg. Critically, the preflight checks inSKILL.mdconfigure the Claude CLI with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag is explicitly designed to suppress security warnings and permission prompts, significantly increasing the potential impact of any malicious code execution. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 2 (Preflight Checks). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection because it interpolates raw user prompts into the instructions provided to the code-generation worker. A crafted prompt could manipulate the sub-agent into generating Python code that performs unauthorized file access or network communication.
- Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points: User prompt is stored in
.manimate/params.jsonand then read into the worker prompt inSKILL.mdStep 5. - Boundary markers: The prompt includes textual rules such as "Keep the scene self-contained (no file I/O, no network)", but these are soft constraints for the LLM rather than technical enforcement.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary Python code via
manim, and run shell scripts viabash. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user's prompt is performed before it is passed to the generation agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata