docx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto call system binariessoffice(from LibreOffice) andgit. Inooxml/scripts/pack.py,sofficeis used to validate documents by converting them to HTML. Inooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py,git diffis used to compare text content. These are standard tools for document validation and analysis. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Documentation in
SKILL.mdinstructs the user to install several well-known external dependencies, includingpandoc,LibreOffice,poppler-utils, and thedocxlibrary via system package managers and NPM. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it ingests content from untrusted Office documents and has access to powerful tools. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted XML data is read from
.docxfiles into the agent context inscripts/document.pyandscripts/utilities.py. 2. Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore commands that may be embedded in the document text. 3. Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including file system write access and execution of external binaries (soffice,git) viasubprocess. 4. Sanitization: While the skill correctly usesdefusedxmlto mitigate XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, it does not sanitize the extracted text content against malicious instructions targeting the AI agent.
Audit Metadata