docx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run to call system binaries soffice (from LibreOffice) and git. In ooxml/scripts/pack.py, soffice is used to validate documents by converting them to HTML. In ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py, git diff is used to compare text content. These are standard tools for document validation and analysis.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Documentation in SKILL.md instructs the user to install several well-known external dependencies, including pandoc, LibreOffice, poppler-utils, and the docx library via system package managers and NPM.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it ingests content from untrusted Office documents and has access to powerful tools. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted XML data is read from .docx files into the agent context in scripts/document.py and scripts/utilities.py. 2. Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore commands that may be embedded in the document text. 3. Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including file system write access and execution of external binaries (soffice, git) via subprocess. 4. Sanitization: While the skill correctly uses defusedxml to mitigate XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, it does not sanitize the extracted text content against malicious instructions targeting the AI agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 6, 2026, 12:32 AM