claude-remote
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled shell script
scripts/session-manager.shto perform session operations. Specifically, thecreatecommand usesosascript(AppleScript) to tell Terminal.app to run a command string. While the script attempts to escape single quotes, it constructs a shell command line (cd '${escaped_dir}' && claude --remote-control '${flags[@]}') which is then passed to Terminal.app for execution. If the directory path or flags are maliciously crafted, this could lead to command injection within the new Terminal window. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically applies the
--permission-mode bypassPermissionsflag when launching Claude Code. This flag is designed to skip security confirmation prompts for tool execution within the agent, effectively reducing the human-in-the-loop security model for the remote session. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdinstructions include a 'Determine Intent' section that instructs the agent to 'detect any options mentioned naturally' from user input. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a user (or data processed by the agent) could inject additional CLI flags or commands into theclaudeexecution process.
Audit Metadata