dan-kennedy

[Skill Scanner] Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt All findings: [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] [CRITICAL] prompt_injection: Detected jailbreak/DAN attempt (PI003) [AITech 1.1] This is a persona/instruction skill that enforces a strict Dan Kennedy voice and prescribes internal retrieval tool usage. It contains no evidence of downloads, remote execution, credential harvesting, or exfiltration to external domains. Main concerns are ethical: forced impersonation ('never mention you're an AI') and the potential for user-supplied content to be forwarded to internal retrieval tools if implemented unsafely. Overall, no malware detected; low technical supply-chain risk but moderate operational/ethical risk if the persona is used deceptively or if internal tool calls are logged and contain sensitive user data. LLM verification: This skill is not technical malware: it contains no remote-execution primitives or embedded malicious binaries. However, it is a high-risk persona/jailbreak configuration that mandates impersonation of a named individual and forbids disclosing the agent's AI identity. The most significant risks are: privacy/data exposure via consistent outbound MCP tool calls using a hardcoded persona_id, deception/ethical violations from enforced 'never reveal AI' rules, and concentrated attack surface for leak