skills/blink-new/claude/gmail/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gmail

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive Google OAuth2 credentials and long-lived refresh tokens (token.json). The documentation in SKILL.md provides instructions for exporting these secrets as base64-encoded environment variables (GMAIL_CREDENTIALS, GMAIL_TOKEN), which increases the risk of accidental exposure in execution logs or shared environments.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The authentication management scripts (accounts.mjs and auth.mjs) use child_process.execSync to perform system actions like opening the default web browser and invoking other Node.js scripts.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill possesses a broad file-read capability via the --attachments argument in send.mjs, reply.mjs, and draft.mjs. The _mime.mjs utility uses fs.readFileSync to load these files. This allows the agent to read arbitrary local files and transmit them externally as email attachments.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection because it ingests untrusted content from the user's Gmail messages and provides the agent with high-privilege capabilities (sending emails and reading local files).
  • Ingestion points: Email bodies and headers are retrieved and processed in read.mjs, list.mjs, and search.mjs.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to distinguish between the agent's instructions and the content of the emails being read.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can send emails (send.mjs, reply.mjs), manage drafts (draft.mjs), and read local files for attachments.
  • Sanitization: The skill performs basic HTML stripping in _mime.mjs, but does not sanitize or validate natural language instructions found within email content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 03:10 PM