gmail
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive Google OAuth2 credentials and long-lived refresh tokens (
token.json). The documentation inSKILL.mdprovides instructions for exporting these secrets as base64-encoded environment variables (GMAIL_CREDENTIALS,GMAIL_TOKEN), which increases the risk of accidental exposure in execution logs or shared environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The authentication management scripts (
accounts.mjsandauth.mjs) usechild_process.execSyncto perform system actions like opening the default web browser and invoking other Node.js scripts. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill possesses a broad file-read capability via the
--attachmentsargument insend.mjs,reply.mjs, anddraft.mjs. The_mime.mjsutility usesfs.readFileSyncto load these files. This allows the agent to read arbitrary local files and transmit them externally as email attachments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection because it ingests untrusted content from the user's Gmail messages and provides the agent with high-privilege capabilities (sending emails and reading local files).
- Ingestion points: Email bodies and headers are retrieved and processed in
read.mjs,list.mjs, andsearch.mjs. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to distinguish between the agent's instructions and the content of the emails being read.
- Capability inventory: The skill can send emails (
send.mjs,reply.mjs), manage drafts (draft.mjs), and read local files for attachments. - Sanitization: The skill performs basic HTML stripping in
_mime.mjs, but does not sanitize or validate natural language instructions found within email content.
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