bmad-os-root-cause-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources such as GitHub PR descriptions, issue discussions, and commit messages.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from
ghandgitcommand outputs, including PR/issue metadata and repository files (e.g., CI workflows). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute
ghandgitcommands and perform file-write operations to the local file system. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the external content is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires and executes
gh(GitHub CLI) andgitcommands to gather evidence. This provides the agent with broad access to repository history, metadata, and configuration files, which is necessary for the skill's primary purpose but represents a powerful capability if subverted via injection.
Audit Metadata