bmad-party-mode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a persistent memory system that records conversation highlights into an append-only file (
.memlog.md). Malicious instructions entered by a user or ingested from external data could be persisted and later re-activated when the agent distills these logs to 'shape the room' in future sessions. - Ingestion points: Found in
references/party-memory.md(reading and distilling past memlogs) andreferences/create-party.md(distilling new personas from user-provided source data such as survey exports or interview notes). - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the ingested memory or source data content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
uv run, spawn subagents with independent context windows, and modify its own configuration using thebmad-customizetool. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the text ingested from external sources or memory logs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture relies on executing internal Python scripts to resolve roster and configuration settings. The
scripts/resolve_party.pyscript usessubprocess.runto call other scripts within the project infrastructure. - Evidence:
SKILL.mddefines several activation steps usinguv run {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/.... The Python scriptscripts/resolve_party.pycontains a_run_jsonfunction that executes external processes to fetch configuration data.
Audit Metadata