bmad-party-mode

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in steps/step-02-discussion-orchestration.md and steps/step-03-graceful-exit.md direct the agent to execute a local bash script at .claude/hooks/bmad-speak.sh. This script is passed the agent's name and its generated response as arguments. Using a shell to process LLM-generated strings is a risky pattern that could lead to command injection if the underlying script does not properly sanitize its inputs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its data ingestion process. In steps/step-01-agent-loading.md, it parses a manifest file (_bmad/_config/agent-manifest.csv) to extract agent identities, roles, and communication styles. These values are then interpolated into the conversation orchestration logic.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads agent-manifest.csv and individual agent files referenced by the manifest in steps/step-01-agent-loading.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the manifest data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via the .claude/hooks/bmad-speak.sh script documented in steps/step-02-discussion-orchestration.md and steps/step-03-graceful-exit.md.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input CSV or agent files is mentioned in the workflow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 17, 2026, 08:50 AM