bmad-walkthrough
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts using
uv runfrom the project's_bmad/scriptsdirectory. It also invokes CLI tools such asgitandghto retrieve status, diffs, and pull request information. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow facilitates a "hooks" system that executes arbitrary steps defined in project-level configuration files (
customize.tomland overrides). Specifically, it processes and executes entries inactivation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_complete, allowing the project environment to dynamically define agent tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Pull request data from
gh pr view, version control diffs fromgit diff, and arbitrary file contents loaded through thepersistent_factsconfiguration. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" delimiters for the interpolated content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for command execution (
uv run), tool usage (git,gh), and file system access. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested diffs or documentation files.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
persistent_factsfeature allows project configurations to inject "foundational context" that the agent carries throughout the workflow. This mechanism could be abused to supply persistent instructions that override the skill's logic or safety guidelines. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the GitHub CLI to fetch remote pull request data from GitHub. This functionality targets a well-known service and is consistent with the skill's primary purpose of code review.
Audit Metadata