skills/bmad-code-org/bmad-module-creative-intelligence-suite/bmad-cis-agent-presentation-master/Gen Agent Trust Hub
bmad-cis-agent-presentation-master
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run a Python script during its activation phase:
python3 {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py --skill {skill-root} --key agent. This relies on an external script located in the project's working directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The activation process involves executing arbitrary commands stored in the
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_appendarrays. These arrays are populated by merging the skill's owncustomize.tomlwith files found in the project directory, such as{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.tomland{project-root}/_bmad/custom/{skill-name}.user.toml. This allows for arbitrary shell command execution sourced from untrusted local files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to read potentially sensitive files from the project directory, specifically searching for
project-context.mdusing a glob pattern (file:{project-root}/**/project-context.md). When combined with the capability to execute shell commands (e.g.,curlorwget), this poses a significant risk of data exfiltration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a high vulnerability to indirect prompt injection. It ingests critical operational data—including personas, principles, and executable activation steps—from multiple files within the project directory (
_bmad/custom/*.toml,_bmad/cis/config.yaml). There are no boundary markers or sanitization processes described to prevent malicious instructions embedded in these files from being obeyed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata